



Increasingly new digital imaging techniques are
creating a world on their own terms, the confer-
ence outline reads. Images, especially digital ones,
are en vogue. Digital imaging technologies stand
for an increasing liquefaction of boundaries. But
what does it mean for the cognitive side of archi-
tecture. In a recent essay in Hunch1 Peter Eisenman
writes that there seems to be a new subject in ar-
chitecture, the mix of students, clients, and critics
that has changed. This new subject is inundated by
media, information and images, and has less moti-
vation for more interpretative kinds of information.
There is less and less interest in a close reading of
the design. I do not believe however that the con-
tinuous re-invention of new concepts like ‘the fold’,
‘the index’, ‘the projective’ and more recently ‘the
post-indexical’ as suggested in Hunch, will help us
much in understanding what is going on in archi-
tecture and its digital techniques. 
Before we go to the architectural discourse, we
ﬁrst have to address more general notions of (hu-
man) nature, bio-sphere, and information society.
How do we address these questions? The concept
of human nature is highly complex; I will not strict-
ly follow the problem of what is called ‘the post
humanist subject’ as it is already well presented in
current cultural discourse or theory. I will address
the problem of ‘digital worlds’ and artiﬁciality from
the problem of ‘grounding’, and the necessity of a
spatio-temporal ‘re-framing’ (as in representation
and production) of architectural thought in terms of
the organic and inorganic in order to get at ways in
which we may rethink the possibility of action and
agency in our times. Cyberspace in particular, forces
human beings to re-conceptualize their spatial situ-
ation inasmuch as they experience their positions in
cyberspace only as simulations in some ‘virtual life’
form, Timothy Luke has argued.2 His argument is
that we might need another reasoning to capture
our present digital worlds. The epistemological
foundations of conventional reasoning in terms of
political realism are grounded in the modernist laws
of second nature, he writes. Today we might need
another epistemic notion on what is real and what
is virtual as the conference suggests. In taking up
the notions of ‘ﬁrst’ and ‘second’ nature, Luke
deﬁnes the ‘third nature’ as informational cyber-
sphere/telesphere. Digitalization shifts human
agency and structure to a register of informational
bits away from one of manufactured matter. Human
presence gets located in the interplay of the two
modes of nature’s inﬂuence. First nature gains its
identity from the different terrains forming the
bioscape/ecoscape/geoscape of terrestrially, Luke
writes. Earth, water and sky provide the basic ele-
ments mapped in physical geographies of the bio-
sphere that in turn inﬂuence human life with natu-
ral forces. Second nature ﬁnds its expression on the
technoscape/socioscape of territoriality. The actions
of people, cities, economies, states constitute these
spaces of territoriality. My main concern is how to
understand our own actions in relation to nature
and the possible architectural and urban solutions.
The concept of action is a complicated one, one
thing is sure, it is not done under the full control of
consciousness; action should rather be felt as a
node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surpris-
ing sets of agencies that have to be slowly disen-
tangled, as Bruno Latour writes.3 Both architecture
and urbanism play an important role in the under-
standing of third nature as digitalized work process-
es and digital architectures, and their relation to
ﬁrst and second nature and its forms of cyberscape
and mediascape of telemetricality. It is difﬁcult, if
not impossible to say where these systems begin or
end, where solutions to the environment might be
found, what kind of agreement we might reach to
solve architectural and urban problems. It is not
that technologies mediate between the human and
the natural, Elizabeth Grosz writes, for that is to
construe technology as somehow outside either the
natural or the human, instead of seeing it as the
indeﬁnite extension of both the human and the
natural and as their point of overlap, the point of
conversion of the one into the other.4 And that will
make the discussion on possible solutions quite
complex. There is indeed a witches’ brew of politi-
cal and environmental arguments, concepts and
difﬁculties that can conveniently be the basis of
endless academic, intellectual, theoretical and phi-
losophical debate, as David Harvey writes.5 Some
common language has to be found, he writes, or at
least an adequate way of translating between differ-
ent languages. His common ground is in ‘the web of
life’ metaphor, it might indeed help us to ﬁlter our
actions through the web of interconnections that
make up the living world, a notion that comes
close to Latour’s idea of his ‘actor-network-theory
(ant). Cultural theory has tended to think in terms
of binary oppositions. Oppositions between closed
and open subjects and inﬁnity; between cognitive
and aesthetic individualism, it has appeared as
nature and culture, capitalism and schizophrenia,
identity and difference. Scott Lash argues that there
is a third party or a third space involved. This third
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party is not to be confused with the earlier men-
tioned ‘third nature’. The third party is not a fold, it
is not an index, or the post-indexical, it is ﬁnally
not any sort of reconciliation of totality and inﬁnity,
or even the notions of the beautiful and sublime.
The third space for him is a ground, an underneath,
a base in the sense of basis.6 We are reﬂexively
judging animals, thus ground is in perception and
community. Both notions are under a lot of pres-
sure with our new digital technologies.
I can agree with Elizabeth Grosz who writes that
we have to be careful with the computer-associated
technologies with their promise of virtual realities.7
By ‘virtual space’ she understands a system of com-
puter simulations of three-dimensional spaces,
themselves laid out within a more generalized
space, known as cyberspace. Virtual realities are
computer generated and acting as a partial homolo-
gy for ‘real’ space within it is located. ‘The Reality
of the Imaginary’ is that it is partial, we need to
consider ﬁrst and second nature too. Like Timothy
Luke, Elisabeth Grosz also sees that it is more and
more difﬁcult to separate cyberspace (the space of
software) from real space. Virtual spaces are interac-
tive environments, the crucial ingredient here is a
responding subject, the ‘wetware’, located in real
space. The subject does not really direct or control
the action she says, as well as participate in a virtu-
al environment. She relates virtual reality to the
promise of a paradoxical contact at a distance, with
the famous example of virtual sex. Luke’s deﬁnition
of the nation state, mass society and global geopol-
itics as historical artefacts used for constructing and
conquering the built environments or social spaces
of second nature can help us along this path.
Second nature is the technoscape/socioscape/etno-
scape of territoriality. Luke might also be right that
many of the changes today cannot be fully under-
stood with these two concepts alone. The elaborate
human constructions become overlaid, interpene-
trated and reconstituted with a ‘third nature’ of an
informational cybersphere or telesphere, he argues.
As a new concept we might want to see this in a
Deleuzian way of a contour, a conﬁguration, a con-
stellation of an event to come. It will also have more
and more implications on the way we deal with
architecture and urbanism. 
Architectural and urban design are deeply in-
volved in what Luke calls ‘third nature’. Until re-
cently design was involved in ﬁrst and second
nature, but with digitalization it has entered a third
nature. This is not only a question of the ‘means’ of
designing, it has, and will, inﬂuence our ways of
seeing and experiencing architecture and the city. It
has caused that increasing liquefaction between the
digital and material world. Grosz might be right
that with computerization we are changing the very
notion of tool or technology itself. Architectural
design will more and more depend on these digital
tools than we might think possible right now. It will
most certainly have effects on what till so far we
consider ground, or city and body. But is does not
mean that the virtual reality of computer space is
fundamentally different from the virtual reality of
writing, drawing, or even thinking, Grosz writes.
The virtual is at the same time the space of the
new, the un-thought, the unrealized. But the capac-
ity for simulation has sensory and corporeal limits
that are rarely acknowledged. To my mind these
corporeal limits and sensory capacities are vital for
architecture, and are too easily and unjustiﬁed
moved out of the way. Let’s brieﬂy see how this
might work out for an advanced position as in Peter
Eisenman. Eisenman is one of the major theoreti-
cians in the American architectural world with a
steady interest in philosophical questions. 
Traditionally, Eisenman writes, architecture was
place bound, linked to a condition of experience.8
Eisenman refers to the comparable notions Luke is
writing about, mediated environments challenge
the givens of classical time, the time of experience.
Writing about his Rebstockpark project for Frank-
furt, Eisenman writes that architecture can no
longer be bound by the static conditions of space
and place. To his mind architecture must deal with
new conditions like the ‘event’.9 Rebstock is seen
as an unfolding event. Events like a rock concert
where one becomes part of the environment, he
says. That is a peculiar reading of Deleuze’s notion
of event in The Logic of Sense. Deleuze speaks of a
ﬁeld of virtual structures, namely events. Events are
not bodies but, properly speaking, incorporeal enti-
ties. They are not physical qualities and properties,
but rather logical or dialectical attributes. Events
belong to the virtual ﬁeld, they are ‘ideal by
nature’, and should not be confused with their
‘spatio-temporal realizations in states of affaires’.
Statements about events are fundamentally differ-
ent from statements about physical qualities and
properties. Events are not what occurs, but are
rather inside what occurs. To Eisenman’s mind
architectural theory has largely ignored this idea of
event. Instead theory has focussed on notions of
ﬁgure and ground. For Eisenman there seem to be
two ways of dealing with this conceptual pair; one
leading to contextualism, and one leading to a tab-
ula rasa like the modern movement imagined. With
architectural modernism there is no relationship
between old and new or between ﬁgure and
ground. What I will do at the end of my lecture is
show you a project that deals with this ﬁgure-
ground relation. The project is digitalized in ﬁlm, it
escapes the binary positions Eisenman is referring
to by using digital techniques to produce the transi-
tion from the virtual to the real. This transition is
neither a jump cut nor a linear process, but a con-
ceptually guided mediating process. I am using
Latour’s notion of ‘mediators’ here, which he dis-
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tinguishes form ‘intermediaries’. The intermediary
transports meaning or force without transformation,
input and output do not have different qualities.
For mediators the input is never a good predictor
for the output, mediators transform, translate, dis-
tort, and modify the meaning or the elements they
are supposed to carry, he writes.10 I will argue from
a position not circumscribed by the American dis-
course in my opening, but by social theories that
are intended to make life better; discourses that
seek not only to make social life intelligible but also
to make it more just and humane. It involves ﬁrst
and second nature too. My argument will be that
with contemporary digital techniques like ‘foldings’,
‘blobs’ and ‘post-indexical procedures’, we are at
risk of ﬁnally loosing all ground. My Northwest
Passage (to speak with the Situationists), is that we
need more ground and permanence in the architec-
tural imagery itself. If society is organized in appear-
ance as Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard have
insisted on, then it can only be contested in the
ﬁeld of appearance. Seen from an architectural per-
spective it means that blobs take the city as an
additive texture without any coherence, technically
they consume too much space since they want to
stand on their own imagined pedestals like the
present architectures in Dubai. Ideologically they
have no concept of the city. They reinforce urban
sprawl, instead of more compact building, they
spread out. There is indifference to the environ-
ment, grounding in a more literal sense is no issue.
In that sense it is different from an earlier artiﬁcial
conception as in Koolhaas’ City of the Captive Globe
(1972) (also devoted to an artiﬁcial conception).
They lack Koolhaas accelerated birth of theories,
interpretations, mental constructions, proposals and
their inﬂiction on the World. In Koolhaas’ world in
the capital of Ego, science, art, poetry and forms of
madness compete under ideal conditions to invent,
destroy and restore the world of phenomenal
Reality. Koolhaas’ plots are like folds all on identical
pedestals, but what they generate is difference. I
think I can agree with Scott Lash’ critique, (although
I think it does not work for Koolhaas as he sug-
gests), but very well for digital architectures: con-
temporary speed supersedes space as indifference
supersedes difference. 
The source for these digital designs is third
nature. Third nature here is largely penetrating ﬁrst
and second nature, it dissolves any notion of
ground, context or collectivity. Ground in the City
of the Captive Globe generates difference, ground
in blobs generates stasis, autogenesis, they take on
the literal quality of Koolhaas’ plots; a solid block
of granite. It at the same time dissolves the notion
of the human body as a living organism. Virtual
reality promises a paradoxical contact at a distance,
Grosz writes. Referring to Howard Rheingold and
Randall Walser, the last one a well-known re-
searcher in cyberspace technology, Grosz criticises
the idea of dispensability or redundancy of the
body, the suggested capacity of computer technolo-
gy to transcend the body. To her this fantasy of dis-
embodiment is that of autogenesis. A megalomani-
acal attempt to provide perfect control in a world
where things tend to become messy, complicated,
or costly; to her it is a control fantasy, a luxury only
affordable by the male subject. Like second nature,
third nature is no doubt a social product. In archi-
tectural design computer technology has facilitated
a shift from the traditional notions of ground. It is
here where my doubts for architecture and urban-
ism begin. In architecture and urbanism we cannot
do without ‘ground’ as a philosophical category. I
think Deleuze and Guattari are right in saying that
thinking takes place in the relationship of territory
and earth. If we loose ﬁrst and second nature, we
loose the very notions of gender, sexuality, ethnic
diversity, uneven distribution of wealth and class of
second nature. Too easily the shift from harsh reali-
ty into the seemingly endless possibilities of the
computer programmes is made, made without any
interest for these categories. It is also a risk in
Eisenman’s Rebstock park where he shifts the no-
tion of ﬁgure ground to one of assumed Deleuzian
folding. We should realize that all spaces are con-
structs and real, including our digital worlds. Virtual
space in Deleuze’s sense is not an unforeseen possi-
bility in the design, to be realized in a certain fram-
ing. It is about a question that will open up new
uncharted territories, no doubt Eisenman’s inten-
tion. First and second nature do not have more
materialized substance than third nature, it is more
than that collective hallucination restricted to the
symbolic domains of social superstructures. It has
that immense material base in communication
satellites, ﬁbre optic networks and the like that
Manuel Castells has analysed.11 But with this dis-
solving of ﬁgure ground, we have opened the door
for the completely neutral concept of ‘location’.
‘Location’ is a neutral datum for digital design.
Foreign Ofﬁce Architects (foa) submitted a design
for the future of the former World Trade Center site
in lower Manhattan. The undulating tower of bun-
dled tubes was accompanied by these remarks:
‘let’s not even consider remembering… What for?
We have a great site in a great city and the oppor-
tunity to have the world’s tallest building back in
New York.’12 ‘Will full amnesia’ Reinhold Martin
calls it, an active blindness to the historical condi-
tions of which 9/11 was only one component.
Digital design here is about the neo-liberal consen-
sus regarding new opportunities opened up by
techno-corporate globalization, he writes. The loca-
tion of these constructions is nowhere, they might
be anywhere. It is like that complexity of move-
ment in Koolhaas international airports, they are for
the greater part interchangeable. 
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Conclusion
For my conclusion I want to brieﬂy go back to a
design we did years ago for a site in Manhattan. It
was a homeless shelter situated upon the old Am-
trak line in the Meat Market district at Washington
Street. I had a ﬁlm made to show what the proce-
dures in my book were about. The ﬁlm itself is con-
verted to a highly complex digital exercise where a
simulated Situationists drift (dérive) through the
Meat Market district is related to conceptual
imagery coming from Rem Koolhaas’ Kunsthal in
Rotterdam and Melnikov’s Russian Constructivism.
The imagery you see in the ﬁlm is not used in an
analogical way in the sense of comparison or typol-
ogy, but in an abstract conceptual way referring to
Modernists perfection and its anxiety with imper-
fection which to my mind is addressed in the
Kunsthal. The ﬁlm is basically a narrative of a walk
through the market area, including at the same
time ﬂashes of the virtual state of the shelter con-
cept, transforming virtuality into a constituted reali-
ty in ﬁlm. There is no suggestion of complexity in
the drawings or in the model as in Eisenman since
it looks all quite clear, a long building on a former
Amtrak line. In my book The Socius of Architecture I
mentioned we were heading for limitlessness on
street level with this shelter. Digital techniques are
operating on a notion of limitlessness also, but here
expansiveness is on the level of the computer pro-
grammes and the media involved. The key differ-
ence is in the way we perceive architecture, to
think of architecture as a medium, rather than as an
art of shelter. For me it is the last one, I believe we
have to think architecture in relation to ‘ground’,
the body and the world. For the majority of people
in the streets it is just a long building, a train would
be the ﬁrst association, it literally sits upon a rail-
road track. The long windows at night will most
likely give the impression of an abandoned Amtrak
car arriving at its destination. But there is more to
it. We found our inspiration in an analysis from
Michael Hays on Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hil-
berseimer. The repetition of sameness in the shelter
is what Michael Hays, analysing Hannes Meyer’s
Co-op Vitrine calls ‘a crucial reversal of standard
Marxist aesthetics’. It is the mechanization, ration-
alization and commodiﬁcation and their psychologi-
cal consequences, that are recommended as the raw
material of a critical aesthetic practice.13 For Meyer,
Hays writes, aesthetic practice must submit to
reiﬁcation. These theoretical positions are not there
to be translated or retroactively fabricated in the
image of what it resembles, I use the proposals in
my book as frameworks of visibility. ‘Framework’
means an effort to make visible the by deﬁnition
formless and un-framable of the sublime,—it raises
the question of what forms and frames this formless
in architectural practices that are by deﬁnition
involved in form(ation). Or, in the words of Zˇizˇek,
‘the proper site of production is not the virtual
space as such, but, rather, the very passage from it
to constituted reality, the collapse of the multitude
and its oscillations into reality—production is fun-
damentally a limitation of the open space of virtual-
ities, the determination and negation of the virtual
multitude’.14
I see this ‘passage’ or ‘mediation’ as a possible
‘ground’ in Scott Lash his conception. It is pro-
duced by a possible ‘actualisation of the virtual’,
the to my mind in formal architecture dormant
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